Adolf Hitler was the central figure of World War II. He was primarily responsible for the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, its ideology and policies, as well as Germany's military aggressions. In other ways, Hitler was also responsible for the decline of his Third Reich and for the crushing defeats that led to Germany's surrender in 1945.
Austrian by birth, Hitler served in the Austrian Army during World War I, achieving the rank of corporal and receiving two Iron Cross medals before leaving the army to pursue politics. As head of propaganda for the obscure National Socialist (Nazi) Party, Hitler proved his ability to make inspiring speeches and to take political advantage of situations. He continued to build his popular support among the people of Germany as well as disaffected military men. In 1923, the Nazis attempted to take over the government in the "Beer Hall Putsch." The attempt failed, and Hitler spent nine months in prison writing his ideologies in the book, "Mein Kampf."
For the next ten years Hitler successfully worked to gain power for himself and the Nazi party through legal means. In 1933, he was appointed Chancellor of Germany. Hitler quickly established himself as dictator, or Fⁿhrer, and turned Germany into a one-party state. Hitler's extreme views on racial hatred, German superiority, and military aggression became the policies of a nation.
Hitler's foreign policy soon led to the annexation of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia. The invasion of Poland in 1939 revealed the true aggression of Nazi Germany, and World War II began. Hitler from the first had assumed direction of the military strategy of the war. He took a personal interest in military operations and often made decisions against the advice of his generals. Nevertheless, by 1941, Hitler's armies had conquered most of continental Europe, and in June 1941, he launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia.
It was at this point that Hitler committed some critical errors in judgment. His constant interference in military decisions allowed the Allies to turn the tide of the war from 1942-43. Hitler had underestimated the resolve of the Russian army; his refusal to make even tactical retreats led to costly defeats on the eastern front. At the same time, Hitler had not counted on the impact the United States forces would have on Allied fighting power. Allied armies defeated the Germans in North Africa, and Sicily, and invaded Italy. Soon Allied bombers were attacking military and industrial targets in Germany. In the face of these defeats, Hitler became increasingly isolated from reality, and his continued interference had a demoralizing effect on the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces.
During 1943, Hitler became obsessed with a possible Allied landing in the south of France. In fact, as General von Blumentritt remarked, "That year he was constantly on the jump--at one moment he expected an invasion in Norway, at another moment in Holland, then near the Somme, or Normandy or Brittany, in Portugal, in Spain, in the Adriatic." (1) Hitler's anxiety was compounded by Allied counter-intelligence and deception operations that suggested various invasion sites. Preoccupied with a potential invasion, he repeatedly interfered with operations along the eastern coast, leaving the divisions in a weakened state. Serious disagreements between the German commanders Rommel and Rundstedt had left an ambiguous command structure on the western front. Hitler himself had taken direct control of four panzer divisions which he alone would direct in the event of an Allied attack.
Hitler and Rommel believed that two attacks were possible, an initial "feint" attack on Normandy, with the main invasion at the Pas de Calais. Hitler was so convinced of this that when the attack on D-Day actually began, he was unconcerned. Vital hours passed as Allied troops and equipment poured onto the beaches, vulnerable to the inevitable German counterattack. In fact, the panzer divisions under Hitler's direct command were within striking distance of the Normandy coast, able to inflict heavy damage upon the Allied invasion force. They awaited orders to attack--but Hitler's aides were unwilling to wake him until the afternoon of D-Day. This twelve-hour delay proved decisive, allowing the Allies to build up a substantial beachhead. Even after some of the panzers were released, heavy Allied air attacks slowed their travel and further delayed the counterattack.
At the end of June 1944, Rommel and Rundstedt demanded to see Hitler, who appeared ignorant of the true state of affairs on the front. The officers pressed for a tactical withdrawal to a new line on the Seine. Hitler refused, and Rommel and Rundstedt returned to France angry and disgruntled. Soon after, Hitler removed Rundstedt from command and replaced him with Field Marshal Kluge. An assassination attempt on July 20 made Hitler even more scornful and mistrustful of his generals. Throughout the Normandy campaign, he intervened in their decisions, sweeping aside the unanimous advice of loyal men to direct the battle in a fashion completely out of touch with reality.
Hitler tried one last gamble to save Normandy. On August 4, Kluge was ordered to gather all his panzer divisions together for a big counterattack at Mortain. The German generals protested and said it would be like putting the Wehrmacht's head into a noose; Hitler complained, "My generals think of nothing but retreat." (2) After an initial, devastating assault that pushed back Allied forces with severe casualties, the counterattack loss its momentum and finally failed with damaging losses of German troops and armor, leading to the toll of over 50,000 German troops in the Falaise Gap. After unsuccessfully ordering the last major German offensive, the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler retreated into the bunkers beneath his Berlin chancellery, remaining there until the end. Finally on 29 April 1945, as Russian bombs and artillery pounded the city above him, Hitler exercised his last shred of control and committed suicide.
_________________________
1. Warren Tute, "D-Day," (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1974), p. 44.
